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1 am to give you an account of the operation of the European 
Monetary System, set in place on 13 March 1979. 1 shall concentrate on 
three main issues: 
-What point has the system reached today? 
-What types of problem have been cni will be encountered? 
- How should the next stage be designed ? 
1.  The European Monetary System has a  number of roots. At an 
internal level it is essentially an act of reason :  the Community refuses 
to allow the hazards and, at times, the aberrations of the system of floating 
exchange rates to jeopardize integration, that is to say its achievements 
to date,  .notably the "unity" of the market. 
Externally, establishment of the EMS, by creating a  zone of stability 
in Europe, is designed to help restore an international monetary order 
which is less fragile and more in tune with economic reality. It is important 
to note here that the setting up of the EMS coincided with the decision 
by the US authorities on 1 November 1978 to intervene actively on the. 
foreign exchange market ;  it is our hope that this decision marked the 
beginning of the end of the period of benign neglect. 
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currencies have been stable :between Septtelll'lbe-11" 
1979 an September 1980, their movement against the ECU,  sterlh'Bg apart,. 
was very limited, in c:oatrast with the fluctuations of tbe $  and the- Yea 
whose variations vis;-a-vis the ECU were respectively 2,5 and 5  time:s &:5 
l.arg,e as those of the currencies o£ the EMS  ... 
B.  The system"s mecha'l'liism.s b.a:ve fi.Bc.ti0n.ed satisfactorily : 
- operatiot». ai  t:1!le: divergence ia.<l:dka:ctar hats led tlte monetary authorities 
not only to  imite~e  em tne exchanges but aliso to have recourse to the 
range of measures provided. for in the Brussels. Resolution before any 
adjustment is made to the ceB-:t.ral rates ;-
. 
- the two minor realiptmmts tm 24 Sept.emher an 30· November 1979 went 
ahead sllWOthly ; 
- intervention in co-~  Clilirrel!licies lta.s e~d  even if  it does not 
match that carried out iu d.olla_rs, <acc"ftntimg fc.ur around 25 %  of the 
total in recent months). 
··• 
C.  It must also be: holl'Be m mind thart. tke system 'h.as benefitted from 
a  combination of favomra'bie factors that have eased its internal strains  • 
From the outset,. the system  bas bee:tt ~- s-cm~e ft~fbility by the level 
at which the currencies we·re hrought wotki!' e~.  rate mechanism, 
the existence of the. n.O'I'lltal. margin of 2,25%- &llld application of  a  6% margin 
to the Italian lira  ..  Tbe Ce·rmaa mark,. an. tllle- odler J:tamd,.  has not forced 
the system upwanis because oi a  reversal iB. Germany"s current account 
position and the level of interest rates  .. 
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In addition, the determination on the part of the authorities to 
make the system a  success and thus to maintain exchange rates has probably 
modified behaviour on the exchanges. To this extent, the stability observed 
over the past two years is attributable almost just as much to the psycholo-
gical impac;t produced by the system's existence as to the way it operates 
technically. 
D.  This stability is all the more remarkable in that, since early 1979, 
events have taken place which might have been expected to cause greater 
strains in the system than those actually experienced : 
- the successive oil price rises since June  1979 have resulted in a  huge 
balance-of-payments  imbalance in the Comunity (over $  40.000 million) ; 
- the average inflation rate in the Community has climbed more rapidly and 
the disparity between the different national rates has tended to widen ;' 
- the major non-Community currencies, the yen and the dollar, have shown 
wide fluctuations  ; 
- lastly, the volume of international liquidity has expanded sharply, and 
this had made exchange rate policies even more vulnerable. 
But the present mechanisms are not perfect.  Let me therefore take 
a critical look at them and at the  same time set out the main lines of 
policy that could be adopted for the second phase of the EMS, for the ·two 
exercises are linked. 
A  word on the second phase :  what needs to be done is lt~ss to 
promote its rapid implementation on the basis of the guidelines laid down in 
1978 than to shape  _it  in such a way that it fully meets the requirements that 
have gradually come to light over the past two years. We should not abandon 
the second phase and the ambitions behind it but give it a form that corres-
ponds as closely as possible to the basic objectives. 
( 
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11.  An assessm~·l\t of the  European Monetary System cannot be 
confined to its technical aspects  :  the ECU, the intervention mechanism, 
the exchange rate meeht.nism, etc.  The technical aspects are the result of 
political choices on whic:h  will depend not only the d.ec.tsion to  move to a.  .. _ 
second phase but also the key features of the -definitive system.  These 
political choices are es.entially three  i-n number :: 
1.  What internal monetary policy powers will the European Monetary Fund 
have to be given so as. to transform a  sophisticated exchange rate 
agreement into a  fully  fledged monetary system ? 
2.  To what  extent will the European Monetary System need to be backed  up 
by a  European ec-onomic  sys1lem  in. order to guarantee both its stability 
and its proper use  in the  interests -of 'balanced growth  ? 
3.  To what  extent will the European Monetary Fund be able to help to 
ensure greater stability of international monet4ry and  financial relations? 
A.  First choice  :  what links sboub:l -be established between domestic 
monetary policies during the  present phase_, and especially once  the 
Monetary Fund has been set up ? 
Experience has shown that, ov-er  a  short period,  fluetuations 
within the system are much less a function  of inflation rate trenp.s than  of 
capital movements on the one hand and nominal interest rates on the other. 
Nominal  interest rates are the key determinant of the  relationships between 
currencies in the short term.  This largely explains the current paradox 
of the  German mark momentarily being in the position of a  weak currency 
'··  ./. 
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in the  system.  These different factors have direct repercussions on the 
European Monetary System and  on the way it develops.  Strengthening 
the EMS requires greater consistency between monetary policies. 
1.  Firstly,  national monetary policies  must  be  conducted in a 
manner that is consistent with the  objective  of ensuring  stability of the 
system and  must  therefore be  brought into harmony among themselves. 
This  means that a  balance must be  found jointly between the various 
objectives  of controlling  the money supply in quantitative terms, 
defending exchange  rates and fixing  interest  r~tes, so as  to ensure 
that the system has  the coherence and predictability which it still 
. 
lacks. I  note in this respect that the  objective  of co-ordinating interest 
rate policies more closely was explicitly  r~a.ffirmed by the Eut·opean 
Council at its  meeting on I December. 
2.  It is also necessary to ensure consistency among the various 
national  monetary policy instruments so as  to  avoid the disparities  or 
contradictions that flow  from  undue  differences  in the  methods  employed. 
The work at present being carried out on· this complex  question must  be 
stepped up, conclusions reached and action taken to  put these  gradually 
into effect. 
B.  I now come to the  second question :  to what extent will the 
European Monetary System need to be backed up by an economic  system 
guaranteeing stability and  improved  growth  ? 
./. 
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The EMS has  given a high degree of exchange rate stability 
between European currencies. Without  a  shade  of a doubt, it has, a.nd 
this is one of its major achievements,  influenced the participating 
countries'  policies by imposing tighter: discipline. Bw.t  it has  not brought 
about a  sufficient reduction in the  disparities between economic  pcrfoma.nccs, 
notably with regard to inflation. In the medium term,  the persistence of 
such a  situation could damage the system. Closer parallelism between 
monetary and economic developments  is therefore essential. 
The Community must  work towards three major related 
objectives  :  defeating  inflation, strengthening competitiveness  and 
promoting growth. In the  fiGht against inflation the  EMS, by requiring 
the maintenance  of stable exchange rates, is encouraging the 
alignment of national monetary and budgetary policies in a  context of 
tight discipline. 
Europe's relative  competitiveness is being eroded.  The second 
major objective is therefore to restore competitiveness,  and hence  to 
give a powerful impetus  to schemes which make up its background;  those 
concerning  investment, innovation,  training etc.  Here too, the  EMS, 
will clearly benefit from  the success of such policies yet will also be 
instrumental in their success in that they require a  satisfactory measure of 
monetary-stability. 
./. 
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With  regard to economic growth,  enhanced  monetary  solidarity 
within the  Community compels  us  to take  steps to ensure  that particular 
Member  States are not forced to seek to restore balance-of-payments 
equilibrium too rapidly, thereby damaging  what  is already an unduly 
sluggish growth rate. The recent Commission proposal for  reinforcing the 
Community loan arrangements to support payments  balances, which  the 
European Council has now endorsed in principle, is one such step :  this 
proposal should be  seen as part of the measures to deal with the recycling 
problem which I don't want to go along with here. 
Over the past two years,  economic  policy co-ordination,  qas 
been strengthened.  Appropriate instruments have been· adopted and the 
two key committees concerned, the Monetary Committee and  the Committee 
of Governors of Central Banks, are once  again playing a  vigorous and 
active role. This approach  must be  further encouraged  :  what  we need 
is not  so much new rules and regulations  as  method,  consistency and 
determination. 
On these two points the following .is the  conclusion. In the 
institutional phase coherence  between  domestic  monetary policies, 
convergence  between the economic policies  and  exchange  rate arrangements 
must be  conducted within a  single framework which guarantees a  balance 
between the  elements of the  System. For example,  to the  extent that 
would have 
the European Monetary Fu,nd  monetary creation powers through its 
credit operations, it must use  these powers, within limits and  subject 
to conditions depending on the compete.nces  which would be  given to  it to 
ensure  a  sufficiently binding link between monetary decisions and 
econom1<!:·--decision s.  This  development of the monetary system  into a 
system which is also economic is a  central element in the rationale 
.  /. 
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})ehind setting up the institutional stage of the EMS. 
c.  The thil"d choice to  be made may be fcn"mulated as follows  : 
to what extent the future European Monetary Fund could contribute 
towards  greater stability in international f'mmu::ial and monetary 
relationships ? 
The  resolution of the  European C~ncil held  in Brussels 
already indicated - and the most recent European Council  reiterated the 
. 
idea- that it was necessary to co-ordinate exchange rate policies vis-a-vis 
non-Community countries and,  as far as possible, to carry out consultations 
with the  countries concerned. 
1.  This  co-ordination must firstly be'·achieved in intervention 
policies,  so as to ensure that interventions against the dollar or in 
dollars do not affect the day-to-day mana..men:t of the  system or the 
situation of the dollar itself.  The twin role. of the  German mark is  of 
particular importance in this counection :  to some extent, the  German 
mark is a  "pilotJ• currency not so much because ollhe influence it 
exercises within the  European Monetary System as because  of the  special 
responsibilities it has vis-a-vis the dollar and together with the  dollar, 
in its capacity as a  reserve currency. 
In this area, the response: must. come from the central banks. 
Cooperation between the central banks has been improving steadily 
following._tbe Umted States' partial abandom:nent of its attitude of 
./. 
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benign neglect, and interventions .1re better coordin3.ted that in the 
·past.  Further progress  must  be  made·  a long these lines. 
2.  Coordination among the major currencies is  of pa rti.:ub.r 
importance for the stability of the international monetary sy_stem.  It 
should obviously extend  to interest rates policies •  More generally, it 
would be  desirabl~ for relationships  between the dollar, the yen and 
the ECU,  while avoiding excessive  rigidity, to be  kept within plausible 
ranges  reflecting economic, commercial  and  monetary  realities in the 
United States,  Japan and the Community. If it is to be a  responsible 
partner in such a  scheme, the Community must be  ahle to act on the 
basis of a  strengthened monetary system. 
3.  The  third approach  will be  to see how the monetary system 
can contribute to improved conditions . in intemational monetary rea tions, 
The tendency towards diversification of reserve : assets  has  increased 
over the last ten years. If this tendency i~ not to  increase the 
instability of the  system in certain circumstances,  there must be close 
cooperation between the monetary authorities. The initiatives taken to 
establish the Special  Drawing Rights more firmly as  the new centre  of 
the international monetary system deserve  to be encouraged  in this 
connection, even ii  the S DR needs  time to be  accepted as the major 
reserve  currency.  The ECU  will also have its contribu.tion to  make 
to achieving a  more orderly pattern of international monetary  relations. 
This  contribution will be limited initi.ally  :  the way we see it, it will 
involve using the  ECU  as  the numeraire in Conununity borrowing  . 
.  /. 
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~  there may be a  need to go further and  to use the ECU, aloagsiote.  the 
national currencies. of the Member States, in reta:ti()ns  with non-
Community central banks . 
I have briefiy d.escribed the  ll'lealSures taken to  strengthen ~he 
monetary s.ys:,tem  and the p.roblems arismg as  regards  the institutional 
phase.  Tite s:tft'f!ll8the1:l:ti'\:g1the rote  of the E.CU  ,_  that is to  say the 
free transferability of the  ECU,  its use· for· settlements without any 
limits  on  acc~ptability to the  creditor· countries, the ~orrect degree 
of convertibility and negQtia.biJli'tJ'  of_tle  ECU,  lastly,  the creation of 
ECUs by the European Monetaey-Fuu a  die same way as national 
currencies, will be the center of the  disc:ussicns: on the European 
Monetary Fund. 
To sum ltp,  estalblisling a  ~.n:u:flle ECV at the  centre of a 
genuine second phase: m  the European Mon.eta.ey System calls for 
decisions on the following four pcint.s  :: 
- What balance must t>e.  struck betweea the power ol the future EMF 
to create ECUs against credits and its powers m  the  economic  policy 
area  ? 
- What authority will a  Fund endowed w~  powers of money creation 
have  in ensuring the coherence,. consisten:11:y a;n.d  discipline of national 
monetaey policies  ? 
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- What relationships should  a  Monetary Fund that is able to intervene 
on the exchange markets  establish with the  major non-Community 
currencies ? 
- What balance and what priorities must be  established between these 
three functions  ?  The choice made in this area will affect the decision 
to be taken on the institutional structure of the  EMF, a  problem which 
I will not deal with today. 
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As a  conclusion, I 'should like to make the  followi~g 
remarks. 
The European Monetary System has been a  success  ;  it must 
be  further developed and strengthened if  it is to fulfil all that was 
expected of it. The necessary developments are being undertaken and 
will, I hope, materialize quickly.  My examination of the possibilities 
has  indicated the path that should in my opinion be  followed. 
The EMS is  a  Community System ;  if it is to achieve its full 
. 
potentiality,  the development  from  a  sophisticated exchange rate 
mechanism to a  solidly based economic  and  monetary  zone  should go 
ahead  with all the  Member States, It must therefore be hoped that 
Greece and  the UK  will be able to fully  participate as soon as 
possible, in order to avoid having to choose  between a  Europe "a la 
carte" or a  Two-tier Europe on the one hand  and, on the other hand, the 
alignment on the highest common denominator which ·is the  permanent 
temptation besetting Europe. Communication faite par M.  Franc;ois-Xavier ORTOLI, 
Vice-President de la Commission des Communautcs 
Europeennes, a la Conference "EUROPEAN BANKii\G" 
organisee par le FINANCIAL  TIMES, le IO decembre 1980 
a AMSTERDAM. 1
Je dois vous presenter une communication sur le fonctionnement 
du systeme monetaire europeen, mis en vigueur le 13 mars 1979. Je 
centrerai cette communication autour de trois themes 
- OU  en est le systep1e ? 
- Quels sont les types de problemes qu'il a eu et aura a  surmonte~? 
- Comment concevoir la prochaine etape ? 
1 - Le systeme monetaire europeen a plusieurs sources~ Au plan interne, 
il est essentiellement un acte de raison •  La  Cominunaute  refuse  de 
'  laisser les hasards et parfois les aberrations du systeme des taux de change 
flottants remettre en cause son integration, c'est-a-dire  ce que l'on 
appelle l'acquis et notamment !'unite demarche. 
Au plan externe, l'etablissement du s.  M· E •. vise' par la creatipn 
d 'une zone de stabilite en Europe, a  contribuer a la restauration d 'un 
ordre monetaire international a la fois moins precaire et exprimant mieux 
les realites economiques. 11  est important a  c.et egard de constater que la 
creation du S.M.  E. coihcide avec la decision prise le le  r  novembre 1978 
par les autorites americaines d 'intervenir activement sur le marc  he des 
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Dans l 'ensemble, le systeme a  fonctionne d 'une fa~  on parf,:titement 
satisfaisante. 
A.  Les monnaies participantes ont ete stables  :  de septembre 1979 
a septembre 1980, leurs variations vis-a-vis de 1  'ECU ont ete tres 
limitees si 1 'on ne tient pas 'compte de la £, alors mSme que les fluctuations 
du $  et du Yen vis a vis de l'ECU  entre septembre 1979 et septembre 1980 
ont ete respectivement  2,5 fois et 5 fois superieures a  celles des monnaies 
du S.M. E. 
B.  Les mecanismes ont donne satisfaction 
• le j2u de l 'indicateur de divergence a  amen~ les autorites monetaires 
a recourir, au-dela des interventions et avant la modification des 
. 
taux piv8ts' ala gatnme de mesures que prevoit la resolution de 
Bruxelles  • 
• les deux realignements mineurs des 24 septembre et 30 novembre 
1979 ont ete effectues dans de bonne  s  conditions • 
• les interventions en monnaies communautaires se :;ont developpces, 
m~me si elles restent inferieures a  celles qui ont ete effectuees 
en dollar (environ 25 %  du total dans la periode la plus recent  e). 
c.  11  faut egalement constater que le systeme a beneficie de facteurs 
.favorables, qui ont limite ses tensions internes.  11  comportait en effct· 
des le depart un element de flexibilite lie au niveau auquel l~s monnuics 
avaient ete introduite  s dans le mecanisme de change, a 1  'existence de la 
marge normale de 2, 25%' et a  celle de la marge de 6% applicable ala 
Lit. Le DM d'  autre part, en raison du retournement de la balance des 
paiements courants· allemands, et du niveau des taux d'inter~t,n'a pas 




Enfin,  la volonte des autorites de faire du systeme un sucd~s et done 
de maintenir les taux a  probablement entrafue une modification  du comporte" 
ment des marches des changes. En ce sens, la stabilite constatee de  puis 
deux ans est presqu' autant le resultat de l'effet psychologique provoque 
par !'existence du systeme que des modalit~s techniques de son fonctionne'f 
ment. 
D.  Cette stabil}te est d'autant plus remarquable que, depuis le debut. 
de l'annee 1979  ~  sont intervenus des evEmements dont on aurait pu penser 
qu 'ils exerceraient une pression plus forte que celle qui a  ete constatee 1 
•  Les hausses su::x::essives du prix du petrole depuis juin 1979 
ont entrafue un desequilibre important des balances des paiement$ 
de. la.'  . Communaute (plus de 40 Mrds $) ; 
•  Le taux d'inflation moyen dans la. Communaute a progresse plus 
rapidement, mais surtout l'ecart entreles 4.ifferents taux nationau~ 
a  eu tendance a se creuser ; 
•  Les grandes monnaies tierces, yen et P,ollar, ont enregistre des 
fluctuations de grande ampleur ; 
•  Enfin, le volume des liquidites internationales s'est fortement 
accru, ce qui a encore augmente la vulnerabilite des politiques 
de change. 
+ 
+  + 
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Les mecanismes actuels ne  sont cepend.:mt  pas a l'abri de 
toute critique.  Je vais  proceder maintenant a cet examen critique tout en 
dtkri'vant les  orientations principales possibles d'une seconde phase 
du  S.M.E., les deux exercices etant lies. 
Un mot  sur la seconde phase  :  il s 'agit tn(llins  de  la promouvoir 
tres vite, sur la base des  orientations fixees en 1978,  que de  la definir 
de  telle  maniere  qu'eHe  reponde  pleinement aux necessites apparues 
progressivement depuiS' deux  ans.  U ne  s'agit pas  de  renoncer a la 
seconde  phase et a ses "ambitions' mais bien de 1 'etablir de  la maniere 
la plus  conforme  aux  objectifs fondamentaux. 
II.  L 'appreciation sur le systeme monetaire ne peut se fa ire seulement, 
l 
en termes  techniques  :  ECU,  mecanisme ¢'in-tervention,  mecanisme de 
change. • .  Au  travers de  la technique, d:es choix politiques conditionneront 
et rna decision de  passer a une  se  ~onde phase' et le  .. s  principaux traits du 
systeme definitif.  11  y  en a  trois principaux  : 
I. QueUes  competences  le Fonds msmetaire  europeen devra-t-il 
exercer en matiere de politique monetaire  interne afin de 
transformer un accord de  change  perfectionne  en un  systcme 
monetaire complet  ? 
2.  Dans quelle me sure le systeme monthaire devra-t-il etre 
complete par un  systeme  economique  europ•~en afin de  garantir 
a la fois  sc.t  stabilite et sa meil1eure utilisation au benefice 
d'une croissance equilibree ? 
.  ...._  .. 
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3.  Dans queUe mesure le Fonds monetaire europeen pourra-t-il 
contribuer  a assurer une meilleure stabilite des relations 
monetaires et financieres internationales ? 
A.  Premier choix : quels liens dans la phase actuelle et surtout 
lorsque le Fonds monetaire. sera cree, convient-il d'etablir entre les 
politiques monetaires internes ? 
L'experience montre que les mouvements a l'interieur du systeme 
sont, sur une breve periode, beaucoup moins fonction de !'evolution des 
taux d'inflation que des mouvements de capitaux,  d' une part, et des taux 
d'interet nominaux, d'autre _part.  Ces taux d'interets nominaux constituent 
!'element esse~tiel de determination des rapports entre monnaies a court 
terme. Ainsi s'explique, dans une large mesure, la situation paradoxale 
actuelle ou le DM apparaft momentane.ment comme la monnaie la plus 
faible du systeme. Ces differents facte'tfrs ont des consequences directes 
sur le systeme monetaire et sur son evolution.  Le renforcement du S.M. E • 
··. 
passe par une coherence accrue des politiques monetaires. 
1.  Tout d'abord les politiques monetaires nationales doivent etre 
conduites de maniere coherente avec l'objectif de stabilite du systeme, 
done rendues compatibles entre-elles. Cela signifie qu'un equilibre doit 
etre trouve en commun entre les differents objectifs de regulation de la 
masse monetaire en termes quantitatifs, de defense  des taux de change et 
de fixation des taux d'interet, afin de donner au systeme cette garantie de 
coherence et de previsibilite qui fait encore defaut. Je note a cet egard qlle 
1  'objectif d'une coordination plus etroite des politiques de taux d'interet 
vient d'etre explicitement reaffirme par le Conseil Europeen du ler dea,mbrc • 
. I. --------- -- --
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2 ..  n est par ailleurs  necessaire d  I assurer la C0mpatibilite entre les 
duferents instruments nationaux de politique  mon~haire pour cviter les 
d.isparites  ou les contradictions  qu 
1 entraine le maniement de  moyens t.rop 
dissemblables. Les travaux en cours  sur ce  sujet complexe  d?ivent etre 
intensifies, des  conclusi,ons tirees et progressivement mises  en oe.uvre. 
B. J'en viens a la seconde question  dans  qu~Ue  me sure le systeme 
monetaire devrait-il etre complete  par un  systeme economique  garantissant 
1 a  stabilite et une meilleure crois.sanc.e ? 
l.e S .. M .. E  .•  a entraine une  grande  stabilite des  taux de change 
entre monnaies europeennes.  ll a,  sans 1 'ombre cl'un doute,  et c 'est un 
de  ses  grands  re.sultats'  influence  le.s politiques  des  pays  participants 
dans  le sens d'une plus  grande discipline  ..  Mais il  n
1a  pas  provoque  de 
reducticn& suffisantes d~s ecarts entre les risultats economiques'  notamment 
en ce qui concerne !'inflation. A moyen terme, la persistence d
1une  telle 
situation pourrait l'affecter. 11  est ind.ispensable de garantir un meilleur 
··. 
parallelisme entre evolution monetaire et evolutie>ns  economiques. 
Notre:  Com.munaute a  trois grands objec.tus lies  :  la defaite·de 
!'inflation, le  renforc.ement de la competitivite, le de.veloppement de la 
croissance. S'agissant de la.lutte centre l"in;.;l.ation,  le S.M. E., mecanisme 
stabilite  · 
contraignant au travers de la  I  des  parites, encourage a 1
1 aligne ment 
des  politiques .monetll.ires  et budgetaires nationales sur un niveau de 
discipline eleve. 
La competitivite relative  de  1  'Europe est en recul.  Le second 
.  . 
grand  objeC:ti:.f  es~ de·  la retablir' done  de  donner un  puissant elan aux - 7-
actions qui constituent son cadre, celles favorisant 1  'inv,~stissement, 
1  'innovation, la formation etc ••• La encore, le systeme, a 1'  evidence 
beneficiaire de la reussite de telles politiques peut contribuer a leur 
succes parce qu'elles requierent une suffisante stabilite monetaire. 
'  En,  ce qui concerne la croissance, notre solidarite monctai rc 
renforcee engage a mettre en oeuvre des moyens pour eviter que certain!) 
Etats membres ne se voient contraints  de rechercher au detriment d 'une 
croissance deja trop faible  ~  un retour exagerement rapide a 1  'equilibre 
de leur balance des paiements.  La proposition que  la Commission a 
recemment faite sur le renforcement de 1  'emprunt ·.communautaire au 
benefice des balances des paiements - qui fait partie du probleme dtt 
recyclage que je n'  evoquerai pas daYantage dans cette communication .. 
pr~ition que le Conseil europeen vient d'  accepter dans son principe, 
repond a  cette exigence • 
Depuis deux ans, la coordination des politiques economiques, 
s'est renforcee.  Des textes ont ete pris dans ce sens, les deux grands 
comites, Comite monetaire et Comite des gouv'erneurs, ont pris une vigueur 
et manifeste une activite nouvelles. Cette  tehd:mce doit s 'accentuer 
c'est moins  une affaire de textes que de methode, de pratique, de 
constance, de volonte. 
+  +  + 
Sur ces deux pcints, la conclusion est la suivante.  Dans une  phas~ 
institutionnelle, la coherence entre politiques monetaires internes, 
convergence dans la conduite des politiques  economiques et accord de 
change proprement dit devra etre assuree a 1  'interieur d'un cadre de 
procedure unique garantissant 1  'equilibre d'ensemble du systeme.  Dans la 
me sure ,  par exemple, ou le Fonds monetaire europeen aurait un pouvoir 
de creation de monnaies centre credits, il devra exercer ce pouvoir dans 
des limites  et sous des conditions dependant des competences qui lui 
seront octroyees pour etablir un lien suffi.::iamment contrai: .gnant entre 
decisions monetaires et decisions economiques. Cette evolution du systeme 
monetaire en un systeme qui soit aussi economique est un element central 
du raisonnement cue le  Dassaae ala  Dhase institutionnelle du  S.M.  F.. - 8  -
c.  Le troisH~me choix a faire peut etre/ ainsi formule  :  d..o.r.3  quelle 
mesure le futur Fonds monetaire  europeen  pourra-t-4.1  contribuer a une 
meilleure stabilite des  relations  financieres  internationales ? 
La resolution du  Conseil europeen de  Bruxelles, dont  1  'idee  a 
ete reprise au dernier Conseil  europeen,  indiquait deja  qu 'il etait necessaire 
que  soient coordonnccs les politiques  de  change  pratiquees a l'egard des  pays 
ti  '~rs et qu 'il soit precede,  dans  route la me sure du possible, a une 
consultation avec les. Etats  concernes. 
1.  Cette coordination doit d'  abord s 'exercer dans  les politiques 
d 'intervention, afin d 'eviter que  des  interventions faites sur le S ou en 
$  n'affectent la gestion quotidienne du  systeme  ou  la situation de  la monnaie 
americaine.  Dans ce cader,  le double  role du DM  revet une importance 
particuliere. La mo·1naie allemande est en effet,  d'une cer.taine fac;:on, 
une  monnaie  directrice  moins  LirJ1uence qu'elle  exerce a l'intt~ricur 
du  systeme  monetaire europeen que  les responsabilit.i:s  particulieres 
qu'elle  detient vis-a-vis du  $  et avec lui, en tant que  monnaie  de  reserve. 
Dans ce domaine  la reponse appartient  aux  banques  centrales. Celles-ci 
cooperent de mi-eux  en mieux  de puis que les Etats-Unis  ont renonce en 
partie a la pratique du Benign  et les interventions  sont mieux 
harrn.onisees  que  par le passe.  progresser dans  cette voie. 
2.  La  coordination  entre  Les  principales  monnaies  rev&t  une  impor-
tance particuliere pour  La  stabilite du  systeme  monetaire  international. 
Cela  devrait  certainement  s'etendre  aux  politiques  de  taux d'interets.  De 
facon  plus  generate,  il serait  souha  le  que  les  rapports  entre  le dollar, 
le  YEN  et  l'ECU  scient  maintenus,  sans  rigidite excessive, a L'interieur de 
''zones  de  vrai semblance"  correspondant  aux  real ites economiques,  commercia les 
et  monetaires  des  Etats-Unis,  du  Japon  et  de  la  Communaute.  Pour  etre  un 
partenaire  responsable,  celle-ci  doit  pouvoir  agir  sur  La  base  d'un  systeme 
monetaire  fortifie. 
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~ .  La trolsi~me orientation sera de voir comment le systeme monetaire 
peut contribuer A un  mei I leur ~qui  I ibre des relations moneta  ires interna-
tionales.  Les tendances A Ia diversification des Instruments de r~serve 
se  sent renforcet:s depuis 10 ans.  Elles imposent une cooperation  etroitl! ~c  s 
autorltes mon~taires  pour eviter que ce mouvement n•accroisse dans 
certaines circonstances l'instabi  I  it~ du systeme.  A  cet ~gard,  les lniti  atives 
prises pour mieux etablir le droit de tlrage special comme nouveau centr~ 
du systeme mon~taire international  m~ritent  d'~tre encouragees,  meme st 
le 0. T. S.  met du tenps A etre admis comme Ia grande monnaie de reserve • 
L • E  C U,  de .  ·_  son  cote ,  .peut aider a une 
- evolution plus ordonnee des relations monetaires internatie>nales.  Ce!te 
contribution sera I imi tee au depart :  II s 1agira - comme r.ous  ! •envisa!J"On~ "" 
de faire usage de JIECU comme numeraire pour des emprunts corr::·rn  •• n.:. .  ..:~~lr-c::>. 
Mats II est possible qu'il faille aller plus loin,  et util_iser I'ECU, a c5t6 cos 
monnaies nationales des Etats membres,  dans les relations avec les  b.::.~~.,_·:;.: 
central  es tl  erces. 
Je  vous  ai  decrit brievement  a  la  fois  les  actions  entreprises  pour 
renforcer  le  systeme  monetaire,  et  les  problemes  qui  se  posent  dans  La 
perspective de  la  phase  institutionnelle.  Le  renforcement  du  role  de  l 1ECU, 
c'est-a-dire  La  transferabilite  Libre  de  ce  dernier,  son  utilisation pour  les 
reglements  sans  limite d'acceptabilite par  Les  pays  creanciers,  sa  convertibilite 
et  sa negociabilite,  enfin  La  creation de  L'ECU  par  Le  Fonds  monetaire  europeen 
selon  Les  memes  formes  que  Les  monnaies  nationales,  sera  au  centre des  debats 
sur  Le  futur fonds  Monetaire  Europeen. 
·-..  .  .  ..  . 
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L'etabllssement d 1un vrat ECU au centre d 1une vraie secondc 
phase du systcme monetaire europeen implique en resl.,fm~~ une decisior;'l st..:r 
les quatre points cl-dessous : 
Que  I equllibre faudra-t-11 etablir entre le pouvcir de creation 
Ci·' 
d 1ECU contre credits du futur F. M. E.  et ·Jes competenccs de cetui-ci 
matiere de politique economique; 
- Quelle autorlte un fonds dote de pouvoirs de creation monctairc 
aura~t..:.fl  p~o:ur assurer Ia coherence,  Ia compatibilite et Ia 
discipline des  polltiques monctalres natlonales 1  -
•  C.uclles  rcl.:ltlons un fonds  mon~t~irc pouvant in:crvcnir !;:.Jr 
les marches des changes devrait-tl etablir avec  ·I es s:-ar.ccs 
monnaies tier-ces  ? 
'  Quel  equilibre,  ~uelles priorites faudra-t-il d6finir c:-::rc 
ces  trois fonctions,  le choix fait en cc dorr..::linc  cor.citicc.."l.:~~ 
!e declsion qui pourra lhrc prise sur Ia st:"'ucture in!:>:i::..:tio."l-
nclle du F. M. E. ,  probleme que je n 1evoqucrai pas at..:jourd !h:..;l. 
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Je  voudrais,  en  conclusion,  faire  les  remarques  suivantes 
Le  systeme  monetaire  europeen  a  bien  fonctionne;  mais  il doit,  pour  repondre 
pleinement  a ses  ambitions,  se  developper  et  se  renforcer  encore.  Ces  deve-
loppements  sont  en  cours;  ils se  poursuivront,  je  l'espere,  rapidement. 
Les  orientations que  j'ai esquissees  representent,  selon  moi,  lo voie  a suivre. 
Le  SME  est  un  systeme  de  La  Communaute.Pour  lui  donner  toute  sa  dimension, 
le  passage  d'un  accord  de  change  perfectionne a une  zone  economique  et 
monetaire  fortement  structuree devrait  se  faire  avec  tous  les  Etats  membres. 
Il  faut  done  esperer que  La  Grece  et  le Royaume-Uni  pourront  des  que  possible 
y participer pleinement.  Ceci  eviterait d 1avoir a choisir entre  une  Europe 
"a  la  carte"  ou  une  Europe  a "deux  vitesses",  d'une part, et  un  alignement 
sur  un  plus  grand  commun  denominateur  qui  est  La  tentation permanente  de 
l'Europe,  d'autre part. 
.. ..._., 